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DoD Acquisition “Difficulties”
¨ “DoD’s major weapon system programs continue to take longer, 
cost more, and deliver fewer quantities and (less) capabilities 
than originally planned” GAO
¨ The DoD’s Major Defense Acquisition Projects (MDAPs) for 
2007 experienced
– An average delay of 21 months
– An average program cost growth of 26%, representing 
approximately $295 billion dollars in additional costs (while still 
reducing quantities)
¨ Cost growth is a primary concern as DoD plans to spend 
approximately $935 billion dollars on acquisition between fiscal
years 2009 and 2013 (but other [non-discretionary] pressures 
are likely to reduce the acquisition dollars available).
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Past cost growth studies
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Nunn-McCurdy Amendment
¨Congress tried to directly address the issue of 
unit cost growth with passage of the Nunn-
McCurdy Amendment (NM)
– Passed in 1982, made permanent in 1983
¨NM requires DoD to report when unit cost 
growth of any major defense acquisition 
program is “known, expected, or anticipated”
by a program manager to exceed certain cost 
growth thresholds 
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NM Breach levels
Two levels of unit cost breach:
¨A significant unit cost breach occurred if a program 
experienced cost growth over 15% of the current
baseline estimate
¨A critical unit cost breach occurred if a program 
experiences cost growth of 25% over the current
baseline estimate.  
¨A unit cost breach occurs if a program experiences 
unit cost growth above specified thresholds as 
measured by either program acquisition unit cost 
(PAUC) or average procurement unit cost (APUC). 
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Reporting requirements by NM breach level
¨ For a significant unit cost breach, the Service Secretary must 
– notify Congress within 45 days after the report and
– submit a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) with required 
additional unit cost breach information
¨ For a critical unit cost breach, the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics must 
fulfill all ‘significant’ breach requirements and must 
additionally certify to Congress within 60 days of the SAR 
that the program meets four criteria:
1. the system is essential to national security; 
2. there are no alternatives to such system which will provide 
equal or greater military capability at less cost; 
3. the new estimates of the unit cost are reasonable; and 
4. the management structure for such major defense system is 
adequate to manage and control unit cost.
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Impact of Original NM
¨ Limited data restricts ability to determine impact of 
NM exclusively
– Overall, program acquisition outcomes have not improved 
significantly since implementation of NM
¨ Criticism of NM as not effective due to rebaselining
– Practice of establishing a new “current” baseline to avoid a NM unit 
cost breach 
– Rebaselining does not require congressional notification
¨ As a result, few programs incurred a NM breach 
between 1982-2004.
– Congress has recertified the majority of breached programs
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2006 revision of Nunn-McCurdy
¨The NM statute was amended in 2006 to 
close the rebaselining loophole.  
¨New provision: unit cost growth over the 
original baseline estimate.  
– A significant unit cost breach occurs when cost growth 
exceeds 30% of the original baseline
– A critical unit cost breach occurs when cost growth 
exceeds 50% of the original baseline estimate.  
– The revision did not change the reporting requirements for 
either the significant or critical unit cost breach.
Doubled the thresholds and included “current” as well as  
“original” baseline
Doubled the thresholds and included “current” as well as  
“original” baseline
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Impact of 2006 revision
¨ DoD reported 40 of the 85 current MDAP programs were 
experiencing unit cost growth high enough to warrant a NM breach.  
– However, 25 programs did not breach because the National Defense
Authorization Act permitted the “original baseline estimate to be revised to the 
current baseline estimate as of January 6, 2006” (Office of the Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition Resources and Analysis) 2006).
– Between 2006-2007, 16 additional programs experienced a NM breach.  
¨ Despite increase in the number of program NM breaches, it is too
soon to determine the long-term impact of the legislation on current 
acquisition performance
– Immediate short-term impact has been to provide greater visibility, as well as a
great deal more emphasis on the unit cost growth, relative to the original
program baseline. 
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The Major Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform 
Act of 2009
¨ Congress again amended NM with the Major Weapons 
Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009.  This law 
added two requirements to the process of recertifying 
programs that incur a NM breach.  
¨ A program with a NM unit cost breach now must 
– (a) rescind the most recent Milestone approval and 
– (b) receive a new Milestone approval before any actions regarding the 
contract may continue.  The new Milestone approval requires a 
certification that the costs of the program are reasonable, and the 
certification must be supported by an independent cost estimate that 
includes a confidence level for the estimate. 
¨ This statute was implemented too recently to evaluate its 
impact upon the defense acquisition process. 
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Data Analysis
¨ The authors conducted a data analysis using the 
information provided by the Selected Acquisition Report 
Summary Table for December 2007 (the most recent full 
year set of data available as of the start of research). 
– Analysis of one SAR summary table represents a snapshot in time.
¨ The data analysis computed several tests of 
independence using Fisher’s “exact test”. 
– Fisher’s “exact test” determines the “probability of getting [an 
outcome] as strong as the observed or stronger simply due to the
chance of sampling” (G. David Garson 2008).  
– The interpretation of the Fisher’s “exact test” p-value 0.0x is that there 
is an x% chance that, given the information provided in the 
contingency table, one would randomly draw an outcome as strong or 
stronger than the sample provided.
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Data Analysis explanation
¨ Only programs in development 3 years or longer as of 
the December 2007 SAR were included in the analysis, 
so as to avoid including programs too new to have 
developed significant development difficulties. 
– The data set contains 71 programs that meet this criteria
¨ Prior SAR summary tables were consulted to determine 
if a program has incurred a NM breach or high unit cost 
growth.
¨ Two sets of programs analyzed  
1. Programs that experienced a NM breach (18 programs)
2. Programs that experienced a NM breach, as well as programs that 
would have experienced a NM breach if not rebaselined to avoid the 
new NM provisions (31 programs) 
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Data Analysis example
¨ We are testing to see if NM breach is 
independent of quantity change.
¨ Although the SAR adjusts the cost of 
the program for changes in quantity, 
those that decrease quantity appear 
much more likely to breach.
¨ Interpretation: Programs that 
experience a NM breach are either 
more likely to reduce quantity in order 
to stay within total program cost 









Fisher’s “exact test” estimates there is 
a 0.0% chance that, if quantity change 
is independent of breach, that this 
outcome is a result of random chance
NM Breach by Quantity Change for FY 2007
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Sample Chart of SAR Cost Growth “Causes”
Problem Areas Specific Problems
Requirements 
Definition 
Poor initial requirements definition 
Poor performance/cost trade-offs during development; 
Changes in quantity requirements 
Cost Estimating Errors due to limitations of cost estimating procedures
Failure to understand and account for technical risks 
Poor inflation estimates 
Top down pressure to reduce estimates 
Lack of valid independent cost estimates 
Program 
Management 




Program stretch outs to keep production lines open 
Technical Use of immature technologies 
Adherence to strict performance requirements 
Reliance on proprietary information
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Contracting Lack of competition; Contractor buy-in (to win competition) 
Use of wrong type of contract 
Inconsistent contract management/administrative procedures 
Too much contractor oversight and reporting requirements 
Waste 
Excess profits 
Contractors over staffed 
Contractor indirect costs unreasonable 
Taking too long to resolve undefinitized contracts 
Budgetary Funding instabilities within DoD caused by trying to fund too many 
programs
Funding instabilities caused by congressional decisions 
Inefficient production rates due to stretching out programs 
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB)--formerly DSARC--out of 
synchronization with the services' Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) cycle 
Failure to fund for management reserve 
Failure to fund programs at most likely cost 
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Data analysis conclusions
This data analysis produced two conclusions:  
¨ First, DoD’s current SAR metrics are not useful for determining the 
root cause of unit cost growth in acquisition programs.  
¨ Second, despite data limitations, it appears that programs that 
experience high, unit-cost growth are not randomly distributed. The 
two most important factors were (1) the dollar size of the project and 
(2) the “optimistic estimating” cost category.
¨ Although quantity decrease is highly correlated with NM breach, 
quantity decrease is more likely to be the result of cost growth 
(decreasing units to stay within top line budgets) as opposed to the 
cause of cost growth (decreasing quantity because the mission 
changes) – particularly as the SAR unit cost growth calculation 
adjusts for quantity.
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Case Study #1
¨SBIRS-High: 
– 1996 contract for $4.5B (FY2010 $) with launch by 2004 
(covering four missions “missile warning, missile defense, 
technical intelligence, and battlespace characterization” CRS)
– NM breach in 2001 (immature technologies), resulting in the 
program being restructured and rebaselined.
– Rebaselined in 2005, to avoid second NM breach
– Now at $13.5B (FY2010 $) with launch schedule for 2011
Conclusion: NM did not achieve its objective
5/12/2010
18Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise 
Case Study #2
¨SSN 774
– 1993 contract for next generation of attack sub (with the 
objectives of lower cost and greater versatility)
– 1998 contract awarded to 2 yard “partnership” for $4.2B (4 
ships)
– By 2003 program cost growth 24%, so Navy initialed cost 
reductions
– By 2008, the first Block II ship was “delivered eight months 
ahead of schedule and $54 million under budget” (Associated 
Press 2008) 
Conclusion: Good cost management by DoD can be 
effective
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Findings
1. Unit cost growth has remained high; 
2. Few programs incurred a NM breach until the recent 2006 revision
of the law that requires programs to consider unit cost growth above 
a program’s original baseline (instead of the current authorized 
baseline); 
3. DoD’s data collection has been inconsistent (regarding: definitions;
moving baselines; quantities; etc.); 
4. DoD often has not conducted systematic analysis of root-cause 
problems;
5. Limited and inconsistent data undermines an effective analysis; 
6. NM may identify acquisition problems too late in the development
process to allow program reforms to be effective; 
7. NM’s effectiveness may be limited by its focus on the development 
and procurement of assets, as opposed to the entire life-cycle of the 
program; and 
8. Recent legislation has not been implemented long enough to 
evaluate its impact on DoD acquisition processes. 
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Recommendations
¨ In order to control cost growth, DoD should 
1. Make “unit cost” a military “requirement”
2. Implement a more complete acquisition data information system
3. Consider life-cycle costs when rendering acquisition decisions
4. Directly address the lack of incentives (government and 
budgetary) that allow current underlying problems to persist 
5. Work with Congress to increase funding flexibility (e.g. being 
able to use production and/or O&M money to increase 
development costs so as to save far more significant unit 
production and support costs) 
6. Provide programs with greater requirements flexibility (e.g. 
allowing cost/performance trade-offs, especially for “block I” of 
the deployed system, so that the last 5 to 10% of performance 
“requirements” doesn’t double the unit costs)
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Recommendations (continued)
¨ Regarding NM, DoD should: 
1. Develop a system to determine and distribute lessons-
learned from a NM breach, throughout the DoD and 
2. Develop leading indicators.
¨ On all programs, focus on using internal DoD 
management, acquisition strategy, incentives, and 
oversight (by P.M., service acquisition executives, USD 
(AT&L), etc.) to control unit costs (and, in order to achieve 
the required performance, quantity, cost and schedule)
This can, and must, be done!This can, and ust, be done!
